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The application of machine learning to quantum information processing has recently attracted
keen interest, particularly for the optimization of control parameters in quantum tasks without any
pre-programmed knowledge. By adapting the machine learning technique, we present a novel proto-
col in which an arbitrarily initialized device at a learner’s location is taught by a provider located at
a distant place. The protocol is designed such that any external learner who attempts to participate
in or disrupt the learning process can be prohibited or noticed. We numerically demonstrate that
our protocol works faithfully for single-qubit operation devices. A trade-off between the inaccuracy
and the learning time is also analyzed.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 07.05.Mh
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in quantum information science herald a new
era of information technology. Quantum information sci-
ence has recently penetrated interdisciplinary science and
engineering fields. In particular, a current research topic
is to adapt the basic idea of machine learning for quan-
tum information processing. Although “learning” is a
behavior of humans and other living things, a device or a
machine can also learn a task according to the theory of
machine learning, which was developed as a subfield of
artificial intelligence [1]. In fact, the optimization of con-
trol parameters without any pre-programmed knowledge
can be referred to as a typical task of machine learn-
ing. In this context, the techniques of machine learning
have recently been applied to various quantum informa-
tion protocols [2–6].
Following this trend, here we formulate an intriguing
problem. Suppose that one intends to construct an oper-
ation to execute a particular quantum task. For this pur-
pose, a quantum machine learning technique can be used
to train the operation devices for the desired task. How-
ever, these devices are not necessarily located at the same
place as the one who is designing the task to be taught
(called a provider hereafter). To realize scalable quantum
devices or networks, joint work between different parts
of a composite architecture or between separated partic-
ipants may be necessary. For the purpose, several proto-
cols of distributed quantum information processing have
been developed [7, 8]. Therefore, a quantum learning pro-
tocol performed by a separated learner and provider will
also be required in some realistic application scenarios.
In this study, we design a protocol to prepare an ar-
bitrary quantum device at a distant place by machine
learning. We first assume an arbitrarily initialized de-
vice installed at one place where the learner (say Alice)
is located. The other, spatially separated, provider (say
Bob) determines the target quantum task, which can-
not be directly accessed by Alice. Note that the target
information does not open to any other people. Alice
and Bob use mainly quantum channels to communicate
their quantum states. The output state from the device
at Alice’s location is sent to Bob so that he can assess
the learning progress. To obtain feedback from Bob, Al-
ice also sends reference quantum states, and Bob returns
them to Alice after performing his task. In designing
such a protocol, we employ a specific learning algorithm
called single measurement and feedback [9]. When learn-
ing is complete, we say that Alice’s operation device has
learned to perform the desired quantum task.
We also consider another issue that will be very im-
portant in the related field of called “secure machine
learning” [10–12], which significantly highlighted that the
machine learning process itself could be a target of any
malicious attack. The aforementioned works classified
the possible attack scenarios and defenses against those
providing the theoretical analyses of the lower bound on
attacker’s work function. Here we approach to this is-
sue in a quantum manner, rather focusing on the sce-
nario where Alice and Bob do not want any other ex-
ternal learner. Thus, we design the protocol such that
any malicious attempts to participate in or disturb the
learning can be prohibited or noticed, as long as Alice’s
learning elements (i.e., controllable unitary and measure-
ment devices) are not initially correlated.[24] We will
demonstrate by Monte Carlo simulations that our pro-
tocol works well when learning tasks for qubit states.
The learning time and inaccuracy are also analyzed in
the demonstration.
II. CONCEPT & METHOD
Here we describe our scenario for developing a remote
learning protocol. Suppose that two separated parties,
Alice and Bob, intend to teach a device at Alice’s location
to perform a quantum task. The target quantum task
learned by the device can generally be identified as a
unitary transformation from a given initial state |χA〉 to
a specific final state |τB〉 determined by Bob, i.e., the
2|c〉 |±〉or
M0/1
C-SWAP
Feedback
System
Controllable 
Unitary
Uˆ(a)
Learner (Alice) Provider (Bob)
|c〉
n
· · · |−〉
3
|+〉
2
|c〉
1
|τ˜A〉n · · · |χ˜A〉3 |χ˜A〉2 |τ˜A〉1
ρˆref
target-state
Hˆ Hˆ
M+/-
|χA〉
|τB〉
. . .
Classical Channel
Quantum Channel
1 2 3 n
σˆ
c
x
FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic picture of our protocol. Al-
ice prepares a (fiducial) state |χA〉 (which is also known to
Bob) and initializes her own (unitary) device U for learning.
Bob determines the state |τB〉 of the target (which is known
only to Bob) at a distant place so that Alice’s device U learns
a desired quantum operation (see the main text for details).
provider. Alice and Bob communicate through quantum
and classical channels. The process of our protocol is
illustrated in Fig. 1. The tasks performed by Alice and
Bob and the channels are described in detail below.
(i) Alice’s elements – Alice prepares a controllable de-
vice U to learn a unitary transformation task from a fidu-
cial state |χA〉 (known to only Alice and Bob). Here U
can be expressed as the unitary operator
Uˆ(a) = e−ia
T
G, (1)
where a = (a1, a2, . . . , ad2−1)
T is a (d2 − 1)-dimensional
(real) vector, and G = (gˆ1, gˆ2, . . . , gˆd2−1)
T is a vector
operator whose components are SU(d) group generators
[13, 14]. We assume that d is the dimension of the Hilbert
space of both |τB〉 and |χA〉. In the process, Alice controls
the components aj ∈ [−π, π] (j = 1, 2, . . . , d2 − 1) of
the vector a [25]. Measurement devices and a feedback
system to update the control parameters according to a
learning algorithm are also placed on Alice’s side. Alice
also prepares to generate either |c〉 (c = 0, 1) or |±〉,
which will be used as a reference state in our protocol.
Alice sends both her output state obtained by applying
U to the state |χA〉 and a reference state to Bob for each
trial.
(ii) Quantum channels – Alice and Bob are connected
by three one-way quantum channels (drawn as gray lines
in Fig. 1). Two of the channels are from Alice to Bob
(CABr and CABo ), and the remaining one is from Bob to Al-
ice (CBAr ). The channel CABr carries the reference states,
either |c〉 (c = 0, 1) or |±〉, and CABo transmits Alice’s out-
put states to Bob. The channel CBAr is used to deliver
the reference state from Bob’s task back to Alice.
(iii) Bob’s elements – Bob, the provider, determines
the target state |τB〉 (known only to Bob) and prepares
it for each trial. Note that Bob does not transmit any in-
formation on the target state |τB〉 directly to Alice. After
receiving Alice’s output state and a reference state, Bob
operates a full-fledged quantum module, which consists
of two Hadamard gates Hˆ = (σˆx+ σˆz)/
√
2 and a control-
swap (C-SWAP) gate, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The C-
SWAP gate acts as Cˆswap = |0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1ˆ d2 + |1〉 〈1| ⊗ Sˆ,
where 1ˆ d2 is a d
2-dimensional identity, and Sˆ is a swap
operator, defined as Sˆ |x〉 |y〉 = |y〉 |x〉 [15, 16].
We now illustrate how our protocol runs. First, Alice
publicly declares the commencement to Bob. Here, the
fiducial state |χA〉 is one element of a predetermined set
of initial states, which are agreed upon only by Alice
and Bob in advance.[26]. Bob then determines the target
state |τB〉 according to the input |χA〉 and informs Alice
that he is also ready. When Alice and Bob identify their
signs,[27] the process starts:
[P.1] For every trial, Alice generates a reference state,
either |c〉 (c = 0, 1) or |±〉. For the |c〉 state, Alice applies
the learning unitary operator Uˆ(a) to her input state as
|χA〉 Uˆ(a)−−−→ |τ˜A(a)〉 , (2)
where a is selected on the basis of Alice’s learning algo-
rithm. Note that a is initially chosen at random. For
either |+〉 or |−〉, Alice applies a random unitary opera-
tor Uˆ(rh), such that
|χA〉 Uˆ(rh)−−−−→ |χ˜A(rh)〉 , (3)
where rh = (rh,1, rh,2, . . . , rh,d2−1)
T is a randomly
generated vector (known only to Alice). Thus, the
states |τ˜A(a)〉 and |χ˜A(rh)〉 are sequentially changed
in each trial, depending on the choice of reference
states. Alice sends both the reference state and the
output state |ψA→B〉, prepared as either |c〉r |τ˜A(a)〉o or
|±〉r |χ˜A(rh)〉o, to Bob via CABr and CABo , respectively.
Here, we use the subscripts “r” and “o” to denote the
reference and output modes, respectively. Note that Al-
ice does not open the states that are being sent.
[P.2] Then, Bob applies the delivered state |ψA→B〉
and the target state |τB〉t to his module, where the sub-
script “t” denotes the target mode. It yields the state
|Ψcomp〉 as
|ψA→B〉 |τB〉t
(
Hˆ⊗1ˆ
d2
)
(Cˆswap)
(
Hˆ⊗1ˆ
d2
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ |Ψcomp〉 . (4)
Here, for |ψA→B〉 = |c〉r |τ˜A(a)〉o, the output state|Ψcomp〉 is given as
3|Ψcomp〉 =
∑
k=0,1
1√
2
|k〉r
( |τ˜A(a)〉o |τB〉t + (−1)k⊕c |τB〉o |τ˜A(a)〉t√
2
)
, (5)
whereas for |ψA→B〉 = |±〉r |χ˜A(rh)〉o, we have
|Ψcomp〉 = |+〉r |χ˜A(rh)〉o |τB〉t or |Ψcomp〉 = |−〉r |τB〉o |χ˜A(rh)〉t . (6)
Note again that only Alice knows whether the output
|Ψcomp〉 is equal to Eq. (5) or Eq. (6). Bob resends the
reference state after performing his task, written as ρˆref =
Tro,t|Ψcomp〉 〈Ψcomp|, back to Alice through CBAr .
[P.3] Then, Alice checks the returning state ρˆref as fol-
lows: First, if the prepared reference state was |+〉 or
|−〉, Alice performs the measurement M± with the bases
{|+〉 , |−〉} on ρˆref. Note that Bob’s operation does not
alter the reference states |+〉 and |−〉 [see Eq. (6)]. Thus,
if an unexpected outcome, i.e., “−” (or “+”) for the ini-
tially prepared reference state |+〉 (or |−〉), appears in
M±, Alice can immediately notice that the state trans-
mitted in CABr or CBAr has been altered by an external
learner.[28] Second, for the reference state |c〉 (c = 0, 1),
Alice applies the operation σˆcx = (|1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1|)c to the
returned state ρˆref and performs the measurement M0/1
with the bases {|0〉 , |1〉}. In this case, the measurement
results are delivered to the feedback system for effective
quantum learning.
By iterating steps [P.1]–[P.3], Alice’s device Uˆ(a) is
supposed to learn the desired task,
|χA〉 Uˆ(aopt)−−−−−→ |τ˜A(aopt)〉 ≃ |τB〉 , (7)
where aopt denotes the optimal vector achieved after
learning is complete. To realize this learning process,
we can use the following property: If |τ˜A(aopt)〉 = |τB〉,
Bob’s output state |Ψcomp〉 for the reference state |c〉 is
to be |0〉r |τB〉o |τB〉t just before the measurement M0/1
[see Eq. (5)], so Alice cannot obtain the outcome of |1〉.
More generally, the probability Pr(k|a) that Alice mea-
sures |k〉 (k = 0, 1) in M0/1 can be calculated as
Pr(k|a) = 1 + (−1)
kf(a)
2
, (8)
where f(a) = |〈τB|τ˜A(a)〉|2. Our learning strategy is
thus to update Uˆ(a) until |0〉 is successively measured,
without any single outcome of |1〉, inM0/1. This strategy
is conceptually equivalent to the maximization of f .
III. LEARNING ALGORITHM
To realize the above-mentioned strategy, we employ
the quantum learning algorithm based on single measure-
ment and feedback introduced in Ref. [9]. This algorithm
nF FFnF nFnF
Newest 
data
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data
· · ·· · ·
FIG. 2: Schematic picture of the use of FIFO memory to
record the measurement outcome “fail” or “not-fail” (see the
main text).
requires a finite NL-bit classical first-in-first-out (FIFO)
memory in which the measurement results are recorded
as “fail” or “not-fail” data. Note that, as the memory
size is finite, the newest data have to push the old data
out of the memory (see Fig. 2). Thus, the memory retains
the latest data for the learning process.
In our case, the learning algorithm is programmed in
Alice’s feedback system with the rule for updating the
vector a of U . The learning algorithm runs as follows:
If Alice measures |0〉 in M0/1 (that is, “not-fail”), the
feedback system reserves judgment regarding whether the
current Uˆ(a) is appropriate and thus leaves the vector a
unchanged. Otherwise, if |1〉 is measured (that is, “fail”),
a is updated according to
a
(n) ← a(n−1) + NF
N
r
(n)
l , (9)
where n denotes the number of iterations of the effective
learning process (or the total number of measurements
M0/1 performed), r
(n)
l is a vector randomly generated
at the nth iteration step, and N = min (NL, NF +NnF).
Here, NF andNnF are the number of “fail” and “not-fail”
data recorded in the memory, respectively. Our learn-
ing algorithm is intuitively understandable: The greater
the number of “fail” events is, the more changes are im-
posed. Note that the random vector rl, rather than any
pre-programmed knowledge, is used to develop a. This
feature, i.e., using no pre-programmed knowledge, is a
typical trait of the “learning” in a broad sense, and is of
particular importance in our task, as it implies that any
information about the target |τB〉 is not directly refer-
enced to find the optimal vector aopt.
The learning process is continued until all the “fail”
data are eliminated in the NL memory blocks. We call
this the halting condition. After learning is complete,
i.e., the halting condition is satisfied, Alice’s final output
state |τ˜A(aopt)〉 is supposed to be well matched to the
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) Learning probability PL(n) and (b)
survival probability PS(n) for NL = 100. PL(n) and PS(n)
(red solid line) are obtained by performing 1000 simulations.
In each simulation, the target state |τB〉 is randomly chosen.
The survival probability PS(n) is well fitted to the exponen-
tial decay function e−(n+1−NL)/nc (green dashed line), where
nc is a characteristic constant that characterizes the aver-
age number of effective iterations n required to complete the
learning process; n = nc + NL. We obtain nc ≃ 352 and
thus n ≃ 452. The actual average iteration number in the
simulations is ≃ 478.
target state |τB〉, with f = |〈τB|τ˜A(aopt)〉|2 = 1 − ǫL
(ǫL ≪ 1). Here, we can infer that the learning error ǫL
becomes small for large NL, but a large NL requires a
longer learning time, as explicitly shown later.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We perform numerical simulations to analyze our
learning protocol. Here, we consider the single-qubit tar-
get states (i.e., d = 2) for a numerical proof-of-principle
demonstration. In the simulations, we investigate mainly
the learning and survival probabilities. The learning
probability PL(n) is defined as the probability that learn-
ing is completed before or at a certain number n of ef-
fective iteration steps. The survival probability PS(n) is
defined as PS(n) = 1 − PL(n); thus, it is the probability
that learning is not completed until n [4, 5]. In Fig. 3,
we draw PL(n) and PS(n) for NL = 100 by averaging
over 1000 simulation data. In each simulation, the target
state |τB〉 is randomly chosen. We find that PS(n) is well
fitted to the exponential decay function
e−(n+1−NL)/nc , (10)
where nc is a characteristic constant, and n ≥ NL be-
cause of the definition of the halting condition. As PL(n)
is an accumulate distribution function (by definition), the
average number n of iterations to complete the (effective)
learning process can be estimated from the characteris-
tic constant nc as n = nc + NL. In our case, we ob-
tain nc ≃ 352 by fitting the simulation data and thus
n ≃ 452 with NL = 100, whereas the actual average it-
eration number counted in the simulations is ≃ 478 (see
Tab. I in Appendix B). Note that nc has a finite value,
which means that learning can be completed in a finite
time. The identified states |τ˜A(aopt)〉 after learning are
1
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a) Graph of NL versus n (red circles).
We consider the fitting function n = c1N
α
L (green dashed
line) and find that c1 ≃ 0.72 and α ≃ 1.39. (b) ǫL (red
circles) with respect to NL. In this case, the data are well
fitted to ǫL = c2N
−β
L (green dashed line) with c2 ≃ 1.12 and
β ≃ 0.81. Each point in (a) and (b) is obtained by averaging
1000 simulation data.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) ǫL versus n (red circles). Each point is
the average value of 1000 simulation data; error bars indicate
the standard deviation. We obtain ǫL ≃ 1.10×n
−0.59 by data
fitting (green dashed line).
close to their target states, and ǫL is as small as ≃ 0.027
on average.
For further analysis, simulations are also performed
by increasing NL from 50 to 500 at intervals of 50. In
Fig. 4(a), we plot n with respect to NL. Each point in
the graph is obtained by averaging 1000 simulation data.
The data points are very well fitted to n = c1N
α
L with
c1 ≃ 0.72 and α ≃ 1.39 (for details of the fitting function,
see Appendix C). We also plot the learning error ǫL (av-
eraged over 1000 data) in Fig. 4(b). The data points are
also well fitted to ǫL = c2N
−β
L , and we find c2 ≃ 1.12 and
β ≃ 0.81. From these results, we can see the trade-off re-
lation between the inaccuracy (i.e., ǫL) and the learning
time (i.e., n) depending on NL. To see this more clearly,
we draw the graph of ǫL versus n in Fig. 5 (see Appendix
B). By data fitting, we obtain ǫL ≃ 1.10× n−0.59 (green
dashed line in Fig. 5).
V. DISCUSSIONS ON THE SECURITY
We briefly discuss that our learning protocol is secure
against any other external learner (say Eve). One may
5explore large questions related to the security on the ma-
chine learning. Here, we consider a specific question:
‘Can Eve learn the quantum task originally designed by
Bob without being discovered?’ To deal with this ques-
tion, we consider the two scenarios.
A. Scenario 1: intercept-and-resend attack
We first note that the target state |τB〉 is neither di-
rectly moved to Alice nor removed from Bob’s side. Note
further that the optimized vector aopt cannot be viewed
on Alice’s side after learning is complete. Thus, a strat-
egy that Eve follows would be to intercept the transmit-
ted particles in the channels CABr , CABo , and CBAr , and
to learn |τB〉 or |τ˜A(aopt)〉 from the intercepted particles.
Eve then attempts to resend the particles of the copies
instead of the stolen ones so that Alice and Bob would
not notice it. This, often called “intercept-and-resend
attack,” is typical scheme for breaking a QKD system.
However, this is quite formidable owing to the following
complications:
[SC.1] If the qubit states transmitted through CABr
or CBAr are altered, Alice immediately perceives the al-
terations by the measurement M±, as described above.
This method of using a “cheat-sensitive” (sub)system is
often used in quantum cryptographic tasks.
[SC.2] Even though Eve can intercept the states mov-
ing through CABr , CABo , and CBAr without being discov-
ered, it is still impossible to learn |τB〉 or |τ˜A(aopt)〉
because the intercepted particles, |τ˜A(a)〉 〈τ˜A(a)| and
|χ˜(rh)〉 〈χ˜(rh)|, are highly mixed and indistinguishable.
Actually, in such case, the state of Nint intercepted parti-
cles is close to the random mixture ≃ 12 1ˆ d when Nint ≫ 1
because a and rh are continuously changed in each trial
of the learning process.
[SC.3] We finally note that learning is very sensitive
to any external alteration of Alice’s estimation states
|τ˜A(a)〉 transmitted in CABo (see Appendix B). Thus, even
for any super-Eve who can sort out |τ˜A(a)〉 in CABo , Alice
can be aware of any ill-intentioned attempts by moni-
toring the learning time; any alteration is indicated by
learning that is too late or cannot be completed, even
though unexpected outcomes do not appear in M±.
B. Scenario 2: man-in-the-middle attack
We then consider another scenario, called “man-in-the-
middle attack”, where Eve communicates with Alice pre-
tending to be Bob, and at the same time performs the
learning with Bob pretending to be Alice over the public
channels. In such an attack, Eve can guide Alice’s uni-
tary device(s) into an irrelevant task, e.g., |χA〉 → |τE〉,
and can extract Bob’s target state |τB〉 from the identi-
fied task, e.g., |χE〉 → |τB〉, in the learning with Bob.[29]
Nevertheless, it is impossible for Eve to learn the target
task, i.e., |χA〉 → |τB〉, since Alice’s input state |χA〉 is
C-SWAP
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The modification of the original pro-
tocol to guard against a man-in-the-middle attack is done
by placing a control-Tˆ operation, defined by Wˆ = |0〉r 〈0| ⊗
1ˆ o+ |1〉r 〈1| ⊗ Tˆo (red dashed box) in Bob’s side and by small
change of the rule [P.1] in Alice’s side (See the main text for
details).
not opened. We thus note that in this sense Eve’s strat-
egy to learn the original task designed by Bob will end
in failure.
However, due to the fact that Eve can still maliciously
interfere the learning process to separate the two legiti-
mate parts, Alice and Bob, any strategy to detect a man-
in-the-middle attack may be necessary. For this purpose,
we can modify our protocol slightly further: First, Bob
mounts a safeguard, identified as a controlled operation
Wˆ = |0〉r 〈0|⊗ 1ˆ o+ |1〉r 〈1|⊗ Tˆo, in the front of C-SWAP
(see Fig. 6). Here, Tˆo is an example operation of the tar-
get task, i.e., Tˆo |χA〉 = |τB〉.[30] Then, Alice changes the
rule [P.1] a bit such that, in case the reference state is |1〉,
Alice sends the state |χA〉 to Bob without any altering so
that the delivered state to Bob is |ψA→B〉 = |1〉r |χA〉o.
In this case, Bob yields the final output state |Ψout〉, by
applying his module, as
|ψA→B〉 |τB〉t
Wˆ ,Cˆswap−−−−−−→ |Ψout〉 = |1〉r |τB〉o |τB〉t , (11)
where the reference state |1〉r goes back to Alice through
CBAr .[31] However, Eve can never produce such an output
|Ψout〉 in Eq. (11) for the case where |c〉 = |1〉, because
Eve cannot make a valid example of Tˆ without knowing
|χA〉 [32]. Thus, if Eve intrudes into the learning, an
unexpected outcome |0〉 will appear in Alice’s measure-
ment M0/1 when |c〉 = |1〉. Therefore, Alice can detect
a man-in-the-middle attack by monitoring whether the
reference state initially prepared in |1〉 would come back
without changes; a measures of |0〉 may indicate the pos-
sible existence of a middle-man, Eve.
6VI. SUMMARY
In summary, we presented a protocol for a quantum
machine learning, where a learner (Alice) could learn
a unitary transformation corresponding to the quantum
task determined by a provider (Bob) at a distant place.
We clarify here that the presented method is also applica-
ble in the case of non-unitary task, as a general quantum
process can be described by an overall unitary transfor-
mation in a quantum system composed of a main and
an extra system, followed by a partial measurement. In
such case, Alice will learn the overall unitary with arbi-
trarily designed extra system and partial measurement
in her side. What is more remarkable is that our pro-
tocol was designed such that an external learner cannot
participate in the learning process. We demonstrated
by Monte Carlo simulations that learning can be faith-
fully completed for single-qubit target states, and ana-
lyzed the trade-off between the inaccuracy and the learn-
ing time. We then gave brief discussions on the security
issues under the scenarios constructed by the terms of
intercept-and-resend and man-in-the-middle attack. We
expect that our protocol will be developed for realistic
applications in quantum information and cryptography
tasks.
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Appendix A: Construction of SU(d) group
generators
For any given d, we can generally define G in Eq. (1),
systematically constructing (d2− 1) Hermitian operators
as follows [13, 14]:

uˆjk = Pˆjk + Pˆjk,
vˆjk = i
(
Pˆjk − Pˆjk
)
,
wˆl = −
√
2
l(l+1)
(∑l
i=1 Pˆii − lPˆl+1l+1
)
,
where 1 ≤ l ≤ d − 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ d.
Here, Pˆjk = |j〉 〈k| is a general projector. Then,
the elements Gˆj of G can be given from the set
{uˆ12, uˆ13, · · · , vˆ12, vˆ13, · · · , wˆ1, · · · , wˆd−1}, satisfying (i)
hermiticity Gˆj = Gˆ
†
j , (ii) traceless tr(Gˆj) = 0 and (iii) or-
thogonality tr(Gˆ†jGˆk) = 2δjk. The elements Gˆj , Gˆk ∈ G
hold the relation,[
Gˆj , Gˆk
]
= 2i
∑
l
fjklGˆl, (A1)
where fjkl is the (antisymmetric) structural constant of
SU(d) algebra. Here, if d = 2 (single qubit), we have
Pauli spin operators as G = {σˆx, σˆy, σˆz}.
Appendix B: Detailed data in Figs. 4 and 5
NL nc n = NL + nc (nsim) ǫL
50 ≃ 143 ≃ 193 (≃ 195) ≃ 0.04727
100 ≃ 352 ≃ 452 (≃ 478) ≃ 0.02690
150 ≃ 718 ≃ 868 (≃ 872) ≃ 0.01964
200 ≃ 996 ≃ 1196 (≃ 1257) ≃ 0.01505
250 ≃ 1365 ≃ 1615 (≃ 1658) ≃ 0.01268
300 ≃ 1711 ≃ 2011 (≃ 2111) ≃ 0.01089
350 ≃ 2176 ≃ 2526 (≃ 2754) ≃ 0.00981
400 ≃ 2478 ≃ 2878 (≃ 3125) ≃ 0.00882
450 ≃ 3207 ≃ 3657 (≃ 3806) ≃ 0.00836
500 ≃ 3758 ≃ 4258 (≃ 4532) ≃ 0.00760
TABLE I: Values of nc, n (nsim), and ǫL in Figs. 4 and 5.
Here we provide the detailed data in Figs. 4 and 5.
By performing numerical simulations while increasing
NL from 50 to 500 at intervals of 50, we characterize
the learning probabilities PL(n) and survival probabili-
ties PS(n). The simulations are performed 1000 times
for each NL. For all the cases of NL, the survival
probabilities PS(n) are well fitted to the fitting func-
tion e−(n+1−NL)/nc [as in Eq. (10)] with the characteris-
tic constant nc. The parameters nc and the (estimated)
average number of iterations n = NL + nc are listed in
Tab. I. Here, nsim denotes the average number of itera-
tions actually counted in the simulations. We also find
the learning error ǫL (averaged over 1000 simulations)
for each NL. The identified values of ǫL are also given in
Tab. I. We note again that the fitting parameters nc have
finite values for all cases. We thus expect that learning
can be completed faithfully for the given NL.
Appendix C: Approximation of nc in a random
learning strategy
Here we approximately estimate nc in a random learn-
ing strategy. To this end, we first consider the probability
Pr(0|a)NL that the learning is completed for any fixed a.
Pr(0|a) is the probability of the success event (namely,
of measuring |0〉 in M0/1) [see Eq. (8)]. To proceed, we
introduce a continuous function,
1
2
≤ Ξ(a) = ξ1(a1)ξ2(a2) · · · ξd2−1(ad2−1) ≤ 1, (C1)
satisfying Ξ(a 6= aopt) < Ξ(aopt) = 1. We note that this
function Ξ(a) is made by minimizing |Ξ(a) − P (0|a)| for
all a. Thus, we infer that P (0|a)NL → 1 when a→ aopt
whereas P (0|a)NL → 0 when a is far from aopt, and
consequently, we can assume that P (0|a)NL ≃ Ξ(a)NL
(∀a) when NL is very large.
7We then use a trick by approximating ξj(aj)
K with a
delta function as
ξj(aj)
K ≈ exp
[
− (aj − aj,opt)
2
2∆2
]
, (C2)
where aj,opt is a component of aopt, and K is assumed
to be sufficiently large but K ≪ NL. Thus, we can also
assume that Ξ(a)K ≃ P (0|a)K . In the circumstance, we
estimate the average probability P (0|a)NLavg, such that (for
∆≪ 1 [33])
P (0|a)NLavg ≃
∫
da1ξ1(a1)
NL
∫
da2ξ1(a2)
NL · · ·
∫
dad2−1ξd2−1(ad2−1)
NL
≈
d2−1∏
j=1
∫ ∞
−∞
daj exp
[
− (aj − aj,opt)
2
2∆2
NL
K
]
≈
(
K2π∆2
NL
) d2−1
2
. (C3)
Then, let us consider a probability that the learning is terminated at n iteration step:(
1− P (0|a(1))NL
)(
1− P (0|a(2))NL
)
· · ·
(
1− P (0|a(n−1))NL
)
P (0|a(n))NL , (C4)
for any sequence a(0) → a(1) → a(2) → . . . → a(n) of updating the parameter vector in the learning. Thus, in a
random learning strategy, we can approximate the learning probability PL(n), introduced in Sec. IV, such that
PL(n) ≈ P (0|a(1))NLavg
+
(
1− P (0|a(1))NLavg
)
P (0|a(2))NLavg
+
(
1− P (0|a(1))NLavg
)(
1− P (0|a(2))NLavg
)
P (0|a(3))NLavg
...
+
(
1− P (0|a(1))NLavg
)(
1− P (0|a(2))NLavg
)
· · ·
(
1− P (0|a(n−1)avg )NL
)
P (0|a(n)avg)NL
≈
n−1∑
i=0
(
1− P (0|a)NLavg
)i
P (0|a)NLavg = 1−
(
1− P (0|a)NLavg
)n
, (C5)
where P (0|a(1))NLavg = P (0|a(2))NLavg = . . . = P (0|a(n))NLavg = P (0|a)NLavg. Here, using Eq. (C3), we finally arrive at (for
NL ≫ 1 and ∆≪ 1)
PL(n) ≈ 1− e−
n
nc , or equivalently, PS(n) ≈ e−
n
nc , (C6)
where nc ≃ O
(√
N
(d2−1)/2
L
)
.
Appendix D: Effect on learning of any alterations in
CABo
Here we consider a situation in which particles in the
state |τ˜A(a)〉 moving through CABo are altered with a cer-
tain probability pint by some malicious Eve. Here, we
assume a super-Eve who can sort out Alice’s estimation
state |τ˜A(a)〉, discarding the blinded state |χ˜A(rh)〉, in
CABo for his/her own effective learning. Eve’s aim is to
learn Alice’s vector a and thus to obtain the optimal vec-
tor as close to aopt as possible when Alice’s learning is
complete. Eve can thus adopt the strategy of learning
Alice’s vector a using a stolen particle for each trial and
resend the newly generated particle of his/her estimated
state |τ˜E(e)〉 to Bob, where e is a vector of Eve’s own
device.
However, in this case, it takes much longer to complete
the learning process because some particles of |τ˜A(a)〉
are altered as |τ˜A(a)〉 → |τ˜E(e)〉. To corroborate this,
we perform numerical simulations of single-qubit target
states (d = 2). Here, we set NL = 100 and consider three
cases: pint = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. We assume further that
Eve can use the best strategy for each stolen particle,
i.e., |〈τ˜E(a′)|τ˜A(a)〉| = 23 [17]. In Fig. 7, we present the
learning and survival probabilities for pint = 0.1 (red),
0.2 (green), and 0.3 (blue) on a log scale. The survival
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FIG. 7: (Color online) (Color online) (a) Learning probability
PL(n) and (b) survival probability PS(n) on a log scale, as-
suming some Eve who can steal particles moving in CABo with
a certain probability pint. We assume that Eve can adopt the
best learning strategy for her learning (see the main text).
Here, we set NL = 100 and consider the qubit target states,
i.e., d = 2. We consider three cases: pint = 0.1 (red), 0.2
(green), and 0.3 (blue). We perform 1000 simulations to draw
the graphs. In each simulation, the target state |τ 〉 is ran-
domly chosen. The survival probabilities PS(n) are also well
fitted to Eq. (10) (black solid lines).
probabilities are also well matched to Eq. (10). The data
are listed in Tab. II. Note here that n increases exponen-
tially with increasing alteration probability pint. In this
sense, the learning efficiency is very sensitive to the al-
terations. Thus, by monitoring the learning time, Alice
can sense even any super-Eve; if learning is too late or
cannot be completed, Alice stops the learning so that Eve
cannot complete the process e→ aopt.
pint n = NL + nc (nsim) ǫL
0.1 ≃ 1.736 × 103 (≃ 1.747 × 103) ≃ 0.019
0.2 ≃ 1.808 × 104 (≃ 1.956 × 104) ≃ 0.021
0.3 ≃ 2.473 × 105 (≃ 2.767 × 105) ≃ 0.022
TABLE II: Values of nc, n (nsim), and ǫL in Fig. 7.
Here we briefly note that, in a realistic application,
Alice should evaluate and analyze the learning time, i.e.,
nc, by performing the learning with her own devices, be-
fore starting the protocol with Bob. Such task is carried
out taking into account the errors due to the imprecise
control or contaminated devices. The maximum tolera-
ble noise in the channels should also be estimated in this
stage.
[1] P. Langley, Elements of machine learning (Morgan Kauf-
mann, San Francisco, CA, 1996).
[2] D. Manzano, M. Paw lowski, and Cˇ. Brukner, New J.
Phys. 11, 113018 (2009).
[3] A. Hentschel and B. C. Sanders, Phys. Rev. Lett. 104,
063603 (2010).
[4] J. Bang, J. Ryu, S. Yoo, M. Paw lowski, and J. Lee, New
J. Phys. 16, 073017 (2014).
[5] S. Yoo, J. Bang, C. Lee, and J. Lee, New J. Phys. 16,
103014 (2014).
[6] M. Tiersch, E. J. Ganahl, and H. J. Briegel,
arXiv:1407.1535 (2014).
[7] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, P. W. Shor, J. A.
Smolin, B. M. Terhal, and W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 87, 077902 (2001).
[8] B. Reznik, Y. Aharonov, and B. Groisman, Phys. Rev.
A 65, 032312 (2002).
[9] J. Bang, J. Lim, S. Yoo, M. S. Kim, and J. Lee,
arXiv:0803.2976 (2008).
[10] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, R. Sears, A. D. Joseph, and
J. D. Tygar, in Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium
on Information, Computer and Communications Secu-
rity (ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2006), ASIACCS ’06,
p. 16.
[11] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, A. Joseph, and J. Tygar, Machine
Learning 81, 121 (2010).
[12] B. Nelson, B. I. P. Rubinstein, L. Huang, A. D. Joseph,
S. J. Lee, S. Rao, and J. D. Tygar, J. Mach. Learn. Res.
13, 1293 (2012).
[13] F. T. Hioe and J. H. Eberly, Phys. Rev. Lett. 47, 838
(1981).
[14] W. Son, J. Lee, and M. S. Kim, J. Phys. A 37, 11897
(2004).
[15] J. Fiura´sˇek, Phys. Rev. A 73, 062313 (2006).
[16] B. Wang and L.-M. Duan, Phys. Rev. A 75, 050304
(2007).
[17] D. Bruß and C. Macchiavello, Phys. Lett. A 253, 249
(1999).
[18] A. Ac´ın, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and
V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007).
[19] M. Reck, A. Zeilinger, H. J. Bernstein, and P. Bertani,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 73, 58 (1994).
[20] J. Kim, J. Lee, and S. Lee, Phys. Rev. A 61, 032312
(2000).
[21] D. Ljunggren, M. Bourennane, and A. Karlsson, Phys.
Rev. A 62, 022305 (2000).
[22] M. Curty and D. J. Santos, Phys. Rev. A 64, 062309
(2001).
[23] M. Curty, D. J. Santos, E. Pe´rez, and P. Garc´ıa-
Ferna´ndez, Phys. Rev. A 66, 022301 (2002).
[24] Such an assumption could be strong in a device-
independent quantum cryptographic scenario [18]. How-
ever, this condition is essential in machine learning be-
cause one should trust his/her machine to identify, eval-
uate and control the data in the learning process.
[25] The group generators Gˆj can generally be constructed in
any d. Hence such parameterization is quite general (see
Appendix A). The real components aj can be matched to
some real control parameters in experiments, e.g., beam-
splitter and phase-shifter alignments in a linear optical
system [19] or radio frequency (rf) pulse sequences in a
nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) system [20].
[26] This starting assumption is realistic and also may be
important, since a single state |χA〉 could be used as a
cryptographic name (i.e., identity) of Alice in a modified
protocol, as described in Sec. 5. Thus, it may be more ef-
ficient that |χA〉 is prepared as an arbitrarily superposed
state, e.g., a |0〉+ b |1〉.
9[27] Alice and Bob may use a scheme for user authentication
to identify their signs [21–23].
[28] We assumed that there are no noise effects in the channels
CABr and C
BA
r .
[29] Here, |χE〉 and |τE〉 are Eve’s own fiducial and target
state, respectively.
[30] One of the powerful advantages of our protocol is that
Bob does not need to set the device(s) corresponding to
the target task, e.g., Tˆ , in his side, but this advantage
may be weaken in the case where the security issue be-
comes more important.
[31] Noting that Wˆ has no influence on Alice’s learning in the
case where |c〉 6= |1〉, it is easily checked that our previous
analyses remain valid.
[32] Note further that Eve can neither sort out |c〉 = |1〉 in
CABr nor Alice’s state |χA〉 in C
AB
o (See also [SC.1] and
[SC.2]).
[33] The integration limits, from −∞ to∞, are approximated
by this condition.
